This report focuses on state government appropriations to state arts agencies (SAA), a primary figure in arts and cultural policy in the United States. A dynamic panel data estimator can identify the fiscal, institutional, and demographic determinants on SAA appropriations. Agency budgets are particularly sensitive to past appropriations, past state revenues and NEA grants, some demographic variables, party control of state government, and state budgeting rules. Federal funds attract, rather than crowd out, state appropriations. While the influence of some demographic variables may be shifting over time, income growth continues to explain much of SAA appropriations.
nonessential publicly provided good, arts programs may be particularly vulnerable in times of recession. There is also disagreement over the constituency served by SAAs (Lowell 2004 , Jacobs 2004 . Previous observers have characterized the constituency of public arts funding as rather elite (Grampp 1989) , narrow (Lewis and Brooks 2005) , highly networked (Barsdate 2001) , and diversifying (Schuster 2002) . The nature of SAA constituencies should affect the SAAs' susceptibility to budgetary shocks.
Little is known about the effects of socioeconomic and demographic factors, institutional context, and larger political and fiscal cycles on state-level arts expenditures. To explore these effects, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on state expenditures and SAAs budgets in particular. This section also sketches a theoretical model of SAA appropriations. Section 3 outlines the empirical estimation procedure, while Section 4 presents the results of the statistical analyses and hypotheses tests. Finally, a discussion of the results concludes.
Literature Review and Theory
Previous literature on state budget-setting has focused on overall levels of spending by state governments and occasionally on spending in broad categories. Besley and Case (2003) review much of this literature. They offer explanations for its inconsistencies and show some effects on spending of party competition, demographic composition, and institutional rules. They acknowledge that more research is needed to better understand these relationships, a challenge taken up by this paper. Sheffrin (2004) also recently summarizes much of this literature. He observes an emphasis on institutional rules and the role of political parties in models of state-level spending. Lowry (1994, 2000) show how differing party control of state governance can influence spending levels. While Democrats seek larger public budgets, Republicans cut revenues more in response to surpluses. Alt and Lowry, and others, have explored the role of balanced budget rules and other restrictions on state budgeting (see, for example, ACIR 1987 , Poterba 1994 , Craig et al. 1988 , Maag and Merriman 2003 . Merrifield (2000) goes further in modeling the determinants of state expenditure and taxation. He stresses the role of institutional variables, beyond the simple median voter approach, in explaining state expenditures. Using data from 1980, 1985, and 1990, he estimates strong effects from voter preference variables and some institutional variables, although balanced budget requirements played a modest role. James Payne (1998) looks at fifty years of overall state revenues and expenditures and identifies the temporal relationship between taxing and spending in the states. By examining each state separately, he finds that revenue changes cause spending changes in about half of the states.
Other studies have analyzed expenditures in different state spending categories. For instance, Dye and McGuire (1992) characterize state spending patterns and offer stylized facts to explain spending pressures in several categories. McCarty and Schmidt (1997) use a vector autoregressive framework to show how broad state-level spending categories exhibit little crowding out. Increases in spending in one area are paid for via higher revenues rather than decreased spending in other areas.
This previous literature is largely empirical, and it tends to focus on general state-level expenditures or spending in major categories. Earlier research has tended to examine spending on major, priority areas for state budgets rather than spending on a particular agency. For example, Taggart (1989) investigates states' spending on corrections, tests several hypotheses about determinants of corrections funding, and observes spending levels to hinge closely on previous year's spending. Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) explored state spending on education to test for effects of litigation and educational finance reform. Besley and Case (2003) model spending on family assistance and workers compensation, in addition to overall spending. This paper continues this line inquiry by further narrowing the scope of analysis: to the appropriations to a specific state program or agency.
Although a small program area, state arts agencies have attracted much attention. In their very early analysis of SAA appropriations, Hofferbert and Urice (1985) find SAAs an excellent "small-scale policy" area. Later, Netzer (1992) also explores determinants of SAA budget levels in 1987. Recently, Lewis and Rushton (forthcoming) examine budget determinants over 24 years in a basic fixed-effects model that emphasizes demographic influences. The following analysis exploits over 30 years (rather than just five for Hofferbert and Urice and just one for Netzer) in a considerably more robust statistical framework.
A public choice approach to state program appropriations directs attention to institutional factors, relevant constituencies, and incentives facing decision-makers. The previous literature has highlighted important roles for balanced budget rules, party control of state governance, fiscal health and overall state income, and constituency strength.
Appropriations can also be expected to follow the growth in the constituency served, the number of actual or potential beneficiaries of a program.
A handful of economists have discussed SAAs in a public choice context. Grampp (1989) identifies the opportunity for and evidence of rent-seeking over arts funding. The possibility of arts agencies' "capture" at the hands of rent-seekers is emphasized by Lingle (1992) , Peacock (1994) , and Rizzo (1998) . Frey (2000) and others have long wondered how publicly funded arts will alter the types of arts produced. Rushton (2001) notes the lack of inquiry into the process by which rent-seeking behavior translates into changes in policy. He questions the notion that arts funding results from elites lobbying for transfers, as arts programs may enjoy wide support from the public. Besley and Case (2003) offer a useful model to apply to SAA appropriations.
2 The appropriations Y in state i for year t can be modeled as:
where vectors C, I, and T represent political composition, institutional context, and economic and demographic characteristics affecting policy preferences, respectively.
This relationship captures the potentially complex policy process that determines appropriations given political, social, and economic conditions. Besley and Case's equation (2) can be adapted to an empirical model: Rushton (2003) suggests that recently declining public arts funding may be due to rising transaction costs, especially those associated with increasing cultural diversity in the nation. In that case, we might expect to see a general erosion or diffusion of the SAAs' constituency base over time. Hofferbert and Urice (1985) find that constituency variables do not play a large role in SAA appropriations, while agency age and NEA funding had some impact.
Revenue in the arts sector from other, possibly substitute, sources may also affect SAA appropriations. The interaction between private contributions and government funding of charitable organizations has received much attention in the literature (e.g., Ferris and West 2003 , Brooks 2000 , Steinberg 1993 , Lindsey and Steinberg 1990 . Some of it has focused specifically on the arts (e.g., Prieto-Rodríıguez and Fernández-Blanco 2006 , Borgonovi and O'Hare 2004 , Hughes and Luksetitch 1999 . This "crowding out" literature emphasizes explaining how charitable contributions made or received respond to shifts in government funding. In the arts sector, the evidence is mixed at best (Brooks 2004 (Brooks , 2000 . Borgonovi and O'Hare (2004) found NEA support and arts donations to be independent at a national level. Even if aggregate arts donations may not respond to public funding, the possibility that public funding responds to private support has been occasionally acknowledged in the arts and other sectors (Brooks 2000 , A. Payne 1998 .
Where available data permit, proxies for private support of the arts can also be included.
Empirical Model
The empirical analysis here estimates a model of state SAA appropriations using panel data. The SAA budget level in a given state-year depends on the previous year's budget level, other past and current fiscal variables, and other exogenous variables. This model structure raises concerns about the autoregressive nature of the data and exogeneity of explanatory variables. Simple OLS may be biased and inconsistent because of the presence of an endogenous (lagged dependent) variable as a regressor.
The empirical model employed here considers annual SAA appropriations to be a function of several factors according to the following equation:
(1) Taking the first differences, equation (1) becomes:
First-differencing equation (1) eliminates v i but leaves the difference in lagged Y it correlated with the error term via η it-1 . Many instruments are available to estimate (2), based on moment conditions that follow from standard assumptions that η it is uncorrelated with Y i0 , v i , and other η is for all s ≠ t (Ahn and Schmidt 1995) . The Arellano and Bond estimator uses lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined variables, as well as differences in strictly exogenous variables, as instruments. The validity of using lagged values of Y it as instruments for differenced equations for later periods hinges on the moment conditions implied by assuming η it to be serially uncorrelated.
Estimating (2) using lags of the endogenous (Y) and exogenous (C, I, T) and predetermined (H) variables via GMM yields estimates for β, ρ, ψ, ω, γ, and τ.
Instruments for (2) derive from lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables and differences of strictly exogenous variables from all time periods. Notice that, for the differenced equation in (2), the instruments must come from lags at least three periods prior (i.e., for H it-s , s ≥ 3). The construction in (2) Several specification tests are employed for the estimation of equation (2). Tests for the lack of serial correlation and possibly over-identifying restrictions, following Arellano and Bond (1991) , are needed to verify whether the estimator is consistent. First, a second-order autocorrelation test (m 2 ) is performed based on average covariance in the residuals. The consistency of Arellano and Bond's GMM estimator depends on Model 2 in Table 2 shows the estimated model after controlling for state fixed-effects. [ Table 3 about here]
Several hypotheses related to others' observations about public arts funding can also be tested. First, the hypothesis that NEA grants complement SAA budgets cannot be rejected, as it appears that states receiving larger NEA grants also appropriate more to their SAAs. 8 Second, the influence of political composition variables on SAA budgets is apparent. The hypothesis that SAA budgets grow more under Democratic leadership, perhaps because Democrats tend to push for larger state spending, appears only partly true. The results for Models 1 and 2 indicate larger SAA budgets when Republicans control the governorship but not also both houses of the legislature. Third, the proposition that institutional context affects SAA funding finds some support. The hypothesis that some states are more arts-friendly than others can be tested using Model 2, a conclusion that appears warranted for at least a few states. The existence of a departmental location effect is not evident. 9 Stricter budget rules are associated with faster growth in SAA appropriations, rather than slower growth as Barsdate (2001) suggests. The inability of SAA funding to keep pace with inflation presents another challenge for SAA budgets and SAA supporters (who do not appear to be building an increasingly effective lobby, at least relative to other interests). Table 2 also helps identify the role of different constituencies in predicting appropriations. The significance of population density implies the urban core constituency has some effect. The affluent also seem to have some success in affecting SAA budget growth. Racial composition of states, however, appears mostly unrelated to SAA appropriations. Moreover, the share of the population that is young or elderly is inversely related to SAA appropriations. From this analysis, the middle of the age distribution positively affects appropriations rather than the young or elderly constituents. Table 2 offers little support for those tying SAA appropriations to arts education initiatives or to agency capture by old, white art lovers. Appropriations are closely tied to income, however. Education levels, which are commonly found to be strong predictors of support for the arts (e.g., Peterson et al. 2000) , lack a significant relationship in Table   2 . This may be due to College being an inadequate measure of education. The results for income and education are roughly similar to Lewis and Rushton (forthcoming) . The relationship between education and SAA funding is worth exploring in future research.
Hypotheses about a changing constituency base over time can also be tested. Rushton (2003) suggests that increasing diversity may lead to declining public support for the Arts. Lowell (2004) also emphasizes the SAAs' shifting constituency base. To examine whether various constituencies' influence on SAA appropriations has changed over time,
Model 1 was estimated with each of the demographic variables also interacted with the year. The hypothesis that these interaction terms jointly have no effect can be rejected These results lend little support to those who fear that SAAs fare particularly badly during recessions. SAA appropriations are indeed sensitive to fluctuations in state revenues, and the effects are felt for several years, but there is scant evidence that the effects are significantly worse when revenues decline. The lagged effect of revenue changes on SAA appropriations when revenue falls arguably compares favorably to the negative (but insignificant) revenue effect on appropriations when revenue rises.
Discussion
In summary, the appropriations to SAAs follow a somewhat predictable pattern.
Previous year's funding levels and other fiscal variables account for much of the variation in SAA appropriations. In particular, general state revenues from up to two years ago affect current SAA funding, and NEA grants complement state arts appropriations. Statewide demographic trends also guide SAA funding. Having fewer youths and elderly predicts larger SAA budgets, just as rising prosperity is a driving force in rising SAA appropriations. The party composition of state governance plays an important, but complex, role as well. Divided state governments bode well for SAA funding. Temporal effects are strong also, with SAA budget growth suffering a downward time trend and cyclical declines associated with the first year of presidential terms.
These findings significantly add to our understanding of SAA budgeting processes. As reviewed in Section 2, many previous commentators have asserted or suspected determinants of SAA funding. Table 4 lists a selection of these expected relationships alongside the evidence from the present analysis. Some claims find support, while others do not. Perhaps most importantly, the results indicate that NEA funding leverages even more state appropriations. Crowding out from federal aid is not observed. Moreover, SAAs are sensitive to shocks to overall state budgets, and the effects of changes in general revenues ripple through SAA budgets for several years. The claim that SAA budgets are particularly vulnerable during state fiscal crises finds only limited support here. Revenue declines have a significant, negative effect on SAA appropriations with a two-year lag, but appropriations may not fare better following revenue gains. Party politics matters, but it is not as simple as Republicans seeking to cut SAA budgets. The growth in SAA budgets over time owes greatly to the growth in overall state budgets and increasing prosperity -both of these strong trends have outweighed the underlying negative growth rate of SAA budgets.
[ Let the corresponding vector of parameters for T 1it vary over time at a constant rate.
Estimating (2) with state fixed-effects T 1it reveals parameters γ 1 , which correspond to state-specific rates of change.
4 Additional variables were tested in this model, but their role was found to be minimal or not enough years were available. They were excluded for the sake of parsimony. 10 Of the 33 studies, 12 report both WTP and mean sample incomes. The log of the average WTP (median when reported, otherwise mean) was regressed upon the log of the mean sample income, all in 2002 US$. Because studies typically report valuation estimates for multiple goods, samples, or methods, a random effects regression is employed to allow for study-specific error terms. The regression with N = 42 yields a R 2 = 0.37, income elasticity of 0.737, and a robust standard error of 0.14. 1970, 1980, 1989, 1990, [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Missing values imputed using state-by-state regressions with predictors: real per capita income, Youth, and the high school graduation rate, and a time trend. 
